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Flemma: The Case for the Repeal of Congressional Legislation that Places

THE CASE FOR THE REPEAL OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
THAT PLACES CONDITIONS ON SOVEREIGN STATES
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
by Jason D. Flemma*

I. INTRODUCTION

This Note examines legislation that would automatically compel the
United States to deny foreign aid to UN member states based on the number of
votes cast in the UN General Assembly that contravene United States objectives
all without discussion, reflection or debate. 1 The danger is that if such legislation
were enacted, it would legitimize further Congressional attempts to influence the
independence of sovereign states in other international organizations.
It is important to look at this pending bill because fundamental precepts
of international law would be violated, United States relations with the global
community would be jeopardized, the ability of international organizations (that
respond to global problems such as trade, finance, intellectual property, energy,
natural resources, the environment, food, crime and human rights) to function
effectively would be threatened and one of the most important international
organizations - the UN Organization - would be undermined.2 Such legislation
will effect and impact the independent operations of treaty based international
organizations, and can potentially taint the independence of sovereign state
members essential autonomy necessary for the effective functioning of
international organizations now and in the future.
The global community in the 21st century is forming more and more
international organizations. With this increase comes the question of the
relationship of these international organizations with the states that created

"Mr. Flemma is a student at Hofstra Law School where he is a member of the Law
Review. He
would like to thank Professor James E. Hickey, Jr., for his invaluable guidance and scholarly
contribution for this Note. He dedicates this Note to his parents, M. David and Pamela, for their
unconditional love, patience and support.
'See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001).
2 See James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source ofInternationalLegal Personality in the Twenty First
Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1, 2 (1997).
3 In 1994 there were 1,753 international organizations, by 1997 that number increased to 1,830. See
Union of International Associations, Yearbook ofInternationalOrganizations(1994/95 & 1996/97
ed.), availableat http://www.uia.org/website.htm.
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them.4 In law, the question is the relation of international law with domestic law.
The proposed legislation that is the focus of this Note squarely places in issue
that future relationship and the relations of the international community with one
another.
Representative John Duncan Jr. (R-TN) introduced a bill in the House
of Representatives on March 29, 2001 entitled, the "United Nations Voting
Accountability Act" (UNVAA).5 This proposed legislation provides in relevant
part that:
United States assistance may not be provided to a country that
consistently opposed the United States position in the United Nations
General Assembly
during the most recent session of the General
6
Assembly.
The term "consistently opposed the United States position" means that
if a country votes with the United States less then 25% of the time they must
lose United States foreign aid funds.7 Congress has enacted legislation placing
restrictions on federal funds made available to the UN Organization.8 Congress
also has instructed how American representatives to the UN can vote in the
General Assembly 9, but never has Congress tried to directly dictate though its
legislation how sovereign UN member states vote.' 0
This Note argues that the proposed legislation disregards fundamental12
precepts of international law," United States international treaty obligations,
the United States Constitution 3 and should also be rejected as a matter of
policy.

4 For a discussion of the relationship between international legal personalities of non state entities

and the states that created them see, Hickey supra note 2. Professor Hickey states "that the source of
international legal personality for non state entities in the twenty first century ought to... be derived
from states provided states generally both adhere to concepts of popular sovereignty and respond
adequately to the changing realities of global integration." Id. at 3.
' H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 1(2001).
6Id. at § 2(a).
' Id. at § 2(d)(1).
8See generally, Limitations on Contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Pub. L.
No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 447 (1995) (which limited contributions to 25% of the total combined
contributions); Reduction in Appropriations for Contributions to International Organizations if
Official Status, Accreditation, or Recognition is Granted to an Agency Seeking Legalization of
Pedophilia, Pub. L. No. 103-415, § 1(o), 108 Stat. 4301 (1994).
9See generally, United Nations policy on Israel and the Palestinians Act, 113 Stat. 1501A-462
(1999) (declaring that the policy of the United States [is] to promote Israel objectives and end
inequality experienced by Israel in the UN).
10The proposed legislation would use the overall percentage-of-voting coincidences set forth in the
annual report submitted to the Congress by the State Department pursuant to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act (22 U.S.C. § 2414a) to determine which foreign member countries consistently
oppose the United States in the UN General Assembly. See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(1)(2001).
1 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Apr. 30, 1969, reprinted in 63 AM.J.INT'L L 875
(1969) (hereinafter Law of Treaties).
12 See U.N. CHARTER; see also 22 U.S.C.S. § 287 note (2001).
13See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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Section II of this Note provides the text of the UNVAA, its operation,
and broadly explains the reasons for the bill. Section III demonstrates that the
proposed UNVAA violates the fundamental international law principles of
sovereign equality and the rule of pacta sunt servanda.14 In addition, the
UNVAA disregards the UN Charter and the Agreement Between the United
Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquartersof the
UnitedNations (hereinafter, HeadquartersAgreement). 15 Both of these treaties
are the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution,' 6 and both
impose special obligations on the United States in its legal relationship with the
UN Organization.' 7 Section IV argues the UNVAA violates the Constitution of
the United States.
Section V establishes that the UNVAA, if enacted, would contravene
the policy interests of the United States. This Note, in Section VI, concludes that
Congress should reject the UNVAA and similar statutory attempts to control the
voting of foreign sovereign states exercising their voting rights as a participant
in any international Organization.

II. THE UNVAA
The text of the UNVAA provides:
(a) PROHIBITION - United States assistance may not be
provided to a country that consistently opposed the United States
position in the United Nations General Assembly during the most
recent session of the General Assembly.
(b) CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT - If(1) the Secretary of State determines that, since the
beginning of the most recent session of the General Assembly,
there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and
policies of the government of a country to which the
prohibition in subsection (a) applies, and
(2) the Secretary believes that because of that change
the government of that country will no longer consistently
oppose the United States position in the General Assembly,
the Secretary may exempt that country from that prohibition. Any such
exemption shall be effective only until submission of the next report
under section 406 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1990 and 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2414a). The Secretary shall submit to
the Congress a certification of each exemption made under this
subsection. Such certification shall be accompanied by a discussion of

14See Law of Treaties, Apr. 30,1969, pmbl., reprintedin 63 AM.J.INT'L L 875, 875 (1969).
'"

See 22 U.S.C. § 287-2871 (2001).

16U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.

"7See 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001); U.N. CHARTER.
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the basis for the Secretary's determination and belief with respect to
such exemption.
(c) WAIVER AUTHORITY - The Secretary of State may waive
the requirement of subsection (a) if the Secretary determines and
reports to the Congress that despite the United Nations voting pattern of
a particular country, the provision of United States assistance to that
country is necessary to promote United States foreign policy objectives.
(d) DEFINITIONS - As used in this section (1) the term "consistently opposed the United States
position" means, in the case of a country, that the country's
votes in the United Nations General Assembly coincided with
the United States position less than 25 percent of the time,
using for this purpose the overall percentage-of-voting
coincidences set forth in the annual report submitted to the
Congress pursuant to section 406 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991;
(2) the term "most recent session of the General
Assembly" means the most recently completed plenary session
of the General Assembly for which overall percentages-ofvoting coincidences is set forth in the most recent report
submitted to the congress pursuant to section 406 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991; and
(3) the term "United States assistance" means
assistance under (A) chapter 4 of part II of the foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the economic
support fund),
(B) chapter 5 of part II of that Act (relating
to international military education and training), or
(C) the "Foreign Military Financing
Program" account under section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act.18
For fiscal year 2000, this bill would have automatically precluded
sixteen states from receiving a combined total of $2,146,031,000 in United
States foreign aid, which is 13% of the total amount of United States foreign aid
allocated in 2000.19 The most affected country would have been Egypt (the
second top recipient of United States foreign aid) who voted only 21.1% of the
time with the United States in the UN General Assembly and received a total of
$2,054,182,000 in aid.2 °

18 H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. (2001).

19See Votingpractices in the United Nationsfor 2000, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, March 31, 2001, at 15.

2 See id.
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There has been a "gradual decrease in voting coincidence with the
United States overall votes since the Post-Cold War high of 50.6% in 1995",
which in 2000 was down to 43%. 2 1 There obviously is more to United22 States
diplomacy abroad then how countries vote in the UN General Assembly.
Representative Duncan's proposed legislation is a rather ham-fisted and
inappropriate reaction to the faulty idea that the UN and similar international
Organizations somehow infringe on United States sovereignty by placing
obligations on member states, such as to pay dues or deploy troops for UN
peacekeeping efforts.23 In addition, the UNVAA broadly responds to the view
that the United States allocates exorbitant amounts of taxpayer funds to a UN
Organization that is wasteful and cumbersome by establishing
a greater voice
24
for the United States through the UN voting mechanism.
The United States appropriates only a fraction of U.S. public money to
foreign aid.25 In 1998 the United States allocated a total of $13,820,000,000 in
foreign aid.26 While this amount is substantial in dollar terms, when compared to
the United States total budget for fiscal year 1998, $1,721,789 trillion, foreign
aid allotment is less then 1% of the budget, hardly an "exorbitant" amount.27 In
fact, when compared to the rest of the world, the United States gives the smallest
amount of foreign aid in relation to gross domestic product. 28 This dispels the
erroneous contention that Congress overspends on foreign aid.29
More to the point, is the subject of United States arrears to the UN
Organization. 30 The United States actually owes the UN $1.3 billion in dues and
contributions it has failed to make over the past several decades.3' In 1999 the
Clinton Administration agreed to pay $926 million of the $1.3 billion owed to
the UN Organization in three tranches if the UN meets specific United States
reform conditions.32 This agreement is ongoing.33 Until that debt is paid, the
21 Id. at 2.

22United States foreign diplomacy comprises an expansive list, spanning everything from arms

control to national security to war crimes issues. See generally, The United State Department of
State website, at http://www.state.gov/intemtU.
23See Senator Jesse Helms, Address Before the United Nations Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter Senator Helms Address], availableat
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/minority/2000/pr012000.cfm.
24 See id.

2 See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 1999, §28 Foreign Commerce
and Aid.
26See id.
27See Executive Office of the President of the United State, HistoricalTables, Fiscal Year 2002:
Budget of the UnitedStates Government 22 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2001)
28See Energy Information Administration, World Gross Domestic Product at Market Exchange
Rates, 1990-1999,available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emecu/intemational/other.html#intlGDP.
29See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 9 cl. 7 (giving Congress the spending power).
30See Elizabeth Neuffer, US-UN Relations Seen Worsening Overdue US Payments and New Talk of
Freeze Draw IRE ofDiplomats, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 2001, at Al.
31See id.

32See Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau oflnt'l Org. Affairs, U.S. Planfor Paying UNArrears,
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Dec. 3, 1999.

33See Neuffer, supranote 30, at Al (explaining that, "Democratic and Republican leaders of the
House International Affairs Committee agreed this week to release $542 million in back dues, but
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premise that the United States should exert more influence as a matter of right
over the UN Organization and member states is tenacious at best.
In regards to federal expenditure, such as foreign aid, Congress has a
Constitutional responsibility to place checks on the executive branch in its
foreign diplomacy and spend money in the best interest of the people.34
Congress has appropriately participated in international law in such matters as
requiring annual reports on UN member voting practices, narcotics and human
rights, which compels the State Department to incorporate those matters into its
foreign policymaking. 35 For example, under the International Financial
Institutions Act3 6 , the United States representative to international financial
institutions must vote against financial aid if the putative recipient displays a
"pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. ' 3 7 Of
course, Congressional statutory instructions on votes cast by United States
representatives is altogether a different matter from direct Congressional
coercion of the votes of other sovereign states, particularly in the UN
Organization's plenary organ, the General Assembly.

11. THE UNVAA VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE UN
CHARTER AND THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

"Although some individuals posses infinitely more wealth and
influence than others, legal equality matters as it provides the possibility of
access to legal institutions, including law-making processes. 38
The Second Circuit stated, "[i]t is an ancient and salutary feature of the
Anglo-American legal tradition that the Law of Nations is a part of the law of
the land to be ascertained and administered like any other, in the appropriate

lawmakers from both parties proposed freezing an upcoming installment of $244 million until the
United States regains a seat on the Human Rights Commission"); see also Votingpractices in the
UnitedNationsfor 2000, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, March 31, 2001, at 2 (stating "United States arrears
in payment of assessed contributions, and the linking of arrears payments to United Nations reforms,
continued to present a challenge to United States Leadership in the United Nations").
34See U.S. CONST. art. I.
35See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 848 (1994).
36 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 262d.
37The section entitled "Policy goals" states:
The United States Government, in connection with its voice and vote in the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association,
the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
African Development Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development
Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the International
Monetary Fund, shall advance the cause of human rights.
Id. at (a)(1).
38Michael Byers, IntroductionPower, Obligation, and Customary InternationalLaw, II DuKE J.

COMP. & INT'L L. 81, 81-2 (2001).
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case." 39 The UNVAA offers a prime opportunity to ascertain and administer
international law.
A. The UNVAA Violates FundamentalPrecepts of Internationaland
Treaty Law
International law and treaties derive their legitimacy from the
international norms of sovereign equality and the rule of pacta sunt servanda.40
Treaties are key instruments of international
organizations and diplomatic
41
relationships between sovereign states.
1. The UNVAA Violates The Norm of International Law That
States Are Sovereign Equals
On July 4, 1776 Congress declared, "That these United Colonies are,
and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved
from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection
between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally
dissolved. 4 2 On that day United States Sovereignty was established. 43 "National
sovereignty is the undivided power of a people and their government within a
territory and a nation draws on that power when it acts in relationship to other
nations." 44 Clearly, Representative Duncan's proposed legislation does not
respect the independent sovereignty of fellow UN member states.45
International law and relations between states are based on the principle
of sovereign equality. 4 Under sovereign equality no state may unilaterally
exercise power over another sovereign state without that state's permission.47
Such normative notions "are vital to the international legal system. 4 8 If
Congress, who has no accountability whatsoever to sovereign member states,
enacts the UNVAA, it would disregard the rights of those states within the
democratic process of the UN General Assembly.

39Filartiga v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).
40See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III,

introductory note (1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW). "The basic
principle that makes international agreements (including the Vienna Convention on The Law of
Treaties itself) binding is the principle of customary law that agreements must be observed. Indeed,
codification itself assumes the essential validity of the customary law that is being codified and the
authenticity of its substantive content." Id.
4'See id.
42THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).

43See LOUiS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 17 (2d ed. 1996) (stating
"[t]he Constitution did not declare or enumerate the Union's powers to external sovereignty; it
assumed them") (citing Justice Sutherland's opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S.
304 (1936)).
4United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995).
45See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 1.
46See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. I. introductory note (1987).
4'See id.

4See Byers, supra note 38, at 82.
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Senator Helms, in an address before the UN Security Council, stated,
"[tihe Sovereignty of nations must be respected ... [and] nations derive their
sovereignty - their legitimacy - from the consent of the governed. 49 Senator
Helms, in his closing paragraph, warns the UN:
If the United Nations respects the sovereign rights of the American
people, and serves them as an effective tool of diplomacy, it will earn
and deserve their respect and support. But a United Nations that seeks
to impose its presumed authority on the American people without their
consent begs for confrontation and, I want to be candid, eventual U.S.
withdrawal.50
The United States demands that the UN respect its sovereignty and in turn the
United States must respect the sovereignty of member states that comprise
international organizations. Senator Helms candidly told the Security Council
that the UN must refrain from forcing authoritative directives upon the
American people without their consent.51 In turn, the United States must refrain
from inflicting authoritative directives upon the international community
without their consent. President Woodrow Wilson stated it best, "we
see very
52
clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us."
Just as "the American people are one, and the government which is
alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is
the government of the Union. If it their government, and in that character they
have no other ' 53, so to every foreign democratic state government is the
government of their people for which they have no other. The arrogant attitude
of the UNVAA's encroachment into state sovereignty, if enacted, would be as if
the United States Congress said to the international community, 'we know best,
place your sovereign interests in our hands.' 54 Such disregard for the
international community requires the repeal of the UNVAA.
2. The UNVAA Violates the Rule of PactaSunt Servanda
The pacta sunt servanda rule is fundamental to treaty and international
law.55 Pacta sunt servanda, provides that a "treaty in force is 'binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them 56in good faith' unless the treaty has
been affirmatively terminated or suspended.,
49See Senator Helms Address (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/minority/2000/pr012000.cfin.
5 Id.
"1 See id.
52 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech (Jan. 8, 1918), reprintedin ARTHUR S. LINK ET AL.,
EDS., THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (vol. 45 1984).
53Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,414 (1821).
See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001).

55See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 83 (2nd ed. 1984)

(stating "[airticle 26 of the Convention reproduces, in lapidary language, the basic principle pacta
sunt servanda, designated by the Commission as 'the fundamental principle of the law of treaties.'").
56 Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing the RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW and the Law of Treaties).
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The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, on May 22,
1969, at Vienna, adopted by a vote of 79 to 1, the Convention on the Law of
Treaties (hereinafter, Law of Treaties).57 President Richard M. Nixon submitted
the Law of Treaties to the Senate for ratification on November 21, 1971;
however, the Senate has not yet done so.58 Even though the Law of Treaties has
not been ratified, in the State Department's Letter of Submittal to the President it
was stated, "[a]lthough not yet in force, the Convention is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice. 59
The United States Judiciary has recognized and accepted certain
provisions of the Law of Treaties, specifically the rule ofpacta sunt servanda,as
authoritative. 60 The Restatement (Third) on the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, in general, considers the Law of Treaties as "constituting a
codification of the customary international law governing international
agreements, and therefore as foreign relations law of the United States even
though the United States has not adhered to the Convention.",6 1 The Restatement
continued by declaring the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda as fundamentally
essential to international law and agreements.62 The Second Circuit declared
that, "[a]ccording to a widespread legal conviction of the international
community, the Vienna Convention is largely a restatement of customary63rules,
'binding States regardless of whether they are parties to the Convention.'
Even without adopting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
the United States has ratified the Charter of the United Nations, 64 which works
to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
65
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.,
Accordingly, the United States has pledged to honor international agreements.
In addition, international law resolutions adopted by universal
international organizations, such as the UN, "if not controversial and if adopted
by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight." 66 The Law of
Treaties, which was adopted by a vote of 79 to 1, is codified customary law that

57See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. III, introductory note (1987).

'8 See id.
59S.Exec. Doe. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
60See Weinberger v. Rossi, 426 U.S. 25, 29 n. 5 (1982); Fujitsu Ltd., 247 F.3d at 433; Chubb & Sun,
Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating they will "treat the Vienna
Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties"); United States
v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Superville, 40 F.Supp 2d 672, 676
(V.I. 1999) (stating, pactasunt servanda "requires... that the United States respect its obligations
under the treaty. Reciprocity is the foundation of international law"); Danby v. Seaboard World
Airlines, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1134, 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351
F.Supp. 702, 707 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
61 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. III, introductory note (1987).
62 See id.at § 321, cmt. A.
63 Chubb & Son, Inc., 214 F.3d at 308 (quoting Maria Frowkonson, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1988)).
64See U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
65U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
66RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103 cort. (cX1987).
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carries with it great authoritative
weight in spite of the fact that the United States
67
did not formally ratify it.
Therefore, it can be maintained that the fundamental principle ofpacta
sunt servanda is codified customary international law adhered to by the United
States and the international community. 68 The UNVAA breaches two United
States treaties 69 and thus violates the pacta sunt servanda rule and disgraces the
good faith of the United States.70
B. The UNVAA Violates the UnitedNations Charter
The UN Chartercame into force on October 24, 1945,71 and created the
United Nations and its organs including the General Assembly, which is the
object of attack by the UNVAA.72 The UN Organization is determined "to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained., 73 "The
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
members." 74 An important aspect of that sovereign equality is the freedom of all
states to deliberate, recommend and independently vote within the General
Assembly.75 Therefore, member states ability to cast their vote in the General
Assembly free from outside conditions is paramount to realizing the goal of the
UN as "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ...
common ends."76
The objective test of the UNVAA disregards United States obligations
under the UN Charter'sdemocratic principles of respect for the rule of law and
sovereign equality of states.77 While virtually every state has accepted
limitations on their liberty of actions by international agreements,78 fundamental
67 See

id.

See id. at § 321, comt. A. "[T]he fact remains that the process of progressive development and
codification of international law through the activities of the International Law Commission and the
United
Nations General Assembly is bound to continue." See SINCLAIR, supra note 55, at 258.
69
See infra Part III. B-C.
70 See SINCLAIR, supra note 55, at 119 (stating "[t]he principle of good faith underlies the most
fundamental of all the norms of treaty law - namely, the rule pacta sunt servanda.").
"' See 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001).
72See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
73Id.
74
1d. at art. 2, para. 1.
75See Stephan Zamora, Voting in InternationalEconomic Organizations,74 A.J.IL.
566, 566
(1980) (stating "[t]he importance of decisionmaking procedures to successful international
organizations can be seen by the amount of attention paid by governments to the adoption of
appropriate rules of voting procedure for new organizations. Ever since international organizations
began taking decisions by majority vote, conflicts have arisen over decisionmaking controls.").
76U.N. CHARTER art. 1,para. 4.
" See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(d)(1)(200 1).
78 See 45 AM. JUR. 2D InternationalLaw § 41 (2000). For two examples of such state acceptance of
limitations: see Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, available at http://www.cietacsz.org.cn/cietac/English/convention/B 1.htm (which endeavors to promote enforcement and
recognition of international commercial arbitration contracts and to standardize how these
agreements are interpreted and enforced); Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air ("Warsaw Convention"), Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934),
6
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liberties such as the sovereign equality of states are not to be compromised. 79 To
do so would invite a proliferation of retaliatory measures by member states.80
The General Assembly is the plenary organ of the UN Organization,"'
within which independent voting allows each state to democratically voice its
sovereign authority and it is this right Representative Duncan's legislation
would curtail.8 2 "Sovereign equality ... provides states with equal votes in many
international organizations and ensures them the equal benefit of essential
privileges. '8 3 The United State, which celebrates democracy and equality,
instead of curbing should encourage equal voting rights.
Although this Note deals with UN voting practices, the Supreme Courts
discussion of a United States citizen's right to vote in presidential elections in
Bush v. Gore84 is useful to our analysis of how equal voting rights within
international organizations is fundamental to state sovereignty. 5 The Court
stated, "[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for president in its
peoples, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and
one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each
vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter., 86 Votes are to be equally valued
and freely cast and voters equally respected.87
Similarly, the states that created the UN Organization vested the right
to vote in the General Assemble in each of its members equally. 88 Once
established, this voting system adopted by the UN Organization is to be
uniformly respected. Conditions placed on the one-nation, one-vote General
Assembly system 89 intrudes on state autonomy and would disenfranchise
member states. 90 Consequently, the UNVAA should be discarded for violating

reprinted in notefollowing 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105. "The Warsaw Convention sets forth uniform rules
of liability for loss, damage, or delay of international shipments by air, and embodies a tradeoff
between the interests of carriers and shippers." Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423,
428 (2d Cir. 2001)
79See Law of Treaties, Apr. 30, 1969, pmbl., reprintedin 63 AM.J.INT'L L 875, 875 (1969).
'0 See infra Part V.A.
81See UN CHARTER art. 9, para. 1 (stating, "[t]he General Assembly shall consist of all the Members
of the United Nations").
8 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555. (1964).
8 See Byers, supra note 38, at 82 (stating that one of those essential privileges is "diplomatic
immunity for their representatives abroad").
' 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

'5 See id. at 104.
86id.
See id.
88See U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 1.
89See Zamora, supranote 75, at 590.
9o See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104; see also, Byers, supra note 38, at 81 (stating, "[t]he struggle to achieve
and maintain equal rights for all is fundamental to this history of many national legal systems").
Professor Byers goes on to state "[p]rotection of equality in U.S. law is found in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, which served as a foundation for twentieth century civil
rights legislation." Id. at n.3 (citing MARY ANN HARRELL, EQUAL JUSITCE UNDER LAW: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (4th ed. 1982)).
'7
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the UN Charter'srespect for the rule of law and the fundamental right of a state
to exercise its sovereign equality through its vote in the General Assembly. 9 1
C. The UNVAA Violates the HeadquartersAgreement
The United States entered into the HeadquartersAgreement with the
UN Organization, and was unanimously approved by the Senate, which makes it
a treaty in force in the United States. 92 As a result of Congresses ratification of
this treaty 93 the United States is obligated to follow its provisions. 94 The
Headquarters Agreement established the UN Organization's permanent
headquarters in New York City. 95
The proposed legislation violates the Headquarters Agreement by
unilaterally imposing conditions on member states votes in the General
Assembly located at UN headquarters96.
Article III, § 8 of the HeadquartersAgreement states,

The United Nations shall have the power to make regulations,
operative within the headquarters district, for the purpose of
establishing therein conditions in all respects necessary for the
full execution of its functions. No federal, state or local law or
regulation of the United States which is inconsistent with a
regulation of the United Nations authorized by this section
shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be applicable within
97
the headquarters district.

The UNVAA violates article IX, § 27 of the HeadquartersAgreement, which
states, "[t]his agreement shall be construed in the light of its primary purpose to
enable the United Nations at its headquarters in the United States, fully and
efficiently to discharge its responsibilities and fulfill its purposes. 98
The UN Organization thus has the power to create an environment,
within its headquarters, conducive of conducting its affairs. 99 Independent voting
in the General Assembly is an integral part of the UN Organization's legal
personality. Making United States foreign aid contingent on member states
voting practices in the General Assembly would severely impair the UN's
ability to perform its functions and duties in accordance with the UN Charter.
"[S]tates impliedly conferred on the [UN] organization the international legal
personality needed to carry out the functions assigned to it consistent with the
purposes and principles specified in the legal instrument creating it."' ° When
91 See

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.

92See H.R. Con. Res. 75, 50th Cong. (1945)(enacted).

9'See 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001).
94See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 1, cl. 2.
95See 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001).
9 See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. (2001).
9722 U.S.C. § 287 note, art. III, § 8(2001).
98Id. at art. IX, § 27.

99See id.
' See Hickey, supranote 2, at 5.
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resolutions and initiatives are voted on by the General Assembly located in UN
headquarters, article 18 of the UN Charter accords each member state one
vote.' O' The equality and sovereignty maintained by the one-nation, one-vote
system in the UN's plenary organ cannot be compromised.
The congressional resolution that authorized the President to bring into
effect the HeadquarterAgreement provided in relevant part:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its
members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United States and
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization.l°2
Congress was clear in enacting the HeadquartersAgreement, that sovereign
members would have privileges and immunities
within America's boarders to
03
independently carryout official UN duties.1
By placing conditions on member states and their representatives who
vote in the General Assembly, 10 4 the UNVAA violates the privileges and
immunities states maintain at UN headquarters by frustrating those
representatives independence within the General Assembly. 10 5 Accordingly, this
bill should be rejected.

IV.THE UNVAA

VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

As a result of Congresses treaty undertakings, the United States is
legally bound to support and advance the purposes and principles in the UN
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement.10 6 The UNVAA disregards United
States treaty obligations 0 7 and consequently circumvents United States
Domestic law. 10 8
The United States Constitution makes reference to the Law of Nations
in article I, § 8, "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."'(' 9 International law is

101
See U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 1.
10222 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001).
13 See id.

4See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(200 1).

los 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (2001).
106See HENKIN,
07

supranote 43, at 252.

1 See supra Part II. A-B.
o See U.S. CONST.art. VI, § 1, cl.2.

109
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8,c1. 10.
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given effect by the judiciary," 0 is respected by the executive and legislative
branches,' and is a part of the law of the United States.1 2 "Upon ratification of
the Constitution, the thirteen former colonies were fused into a single nation,
one which in its relations with foreign states, is bound both to observe and
construe the accepted norms of international law."" 3
Article VI, § 1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution states: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 114 It is
undisputed that treaties are the supreme law of the land.' 5 Congress, in
implementing the United Nations Charter and the HeadquartersAgreement into
law, has obligated the United States to uphold the rules and policies of these two
treaties."'6
However, treaties can be superceded by a subsequent act of
Congress,"l 7 which is referred to as the later-in-time rule. This rule should not
apply to the UNVAA, because of "[t]he long standing and well-established
position of the Mission at the United Nations, sustained by international
agreements." 118
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
being wise to the fact that the later-in-time rule should not be implemented to
disregard the United States obligations under the UN Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement, denied Congresses attempt to usurp those treaties
when Congress passed the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987." 9 The Anti-terrorism
Acts objective was to ban the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from
operating in the United States. 12 The Act would have forced the PLO to give up
its Permanent Observer status at UN headquarters in New York. 12 1 The court, in
finding the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987 did not obstruct the PLO's Permanent
Observer status at UN headquarters, stated:
The proposed legislation would effectively require the United
States to deny PLO observers the entry, transit, and residence
110
See Filartiga v. Americo Norberto Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the
proposition that customary international law is federal law); see also, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
67878, 700 (1900); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
..See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. I, introductory note (1987). For an example

of how the President and Congress use international treaties domestically, see Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
112
See Curtis A. Bradley, The CharmingBetsy Canon and Separationof Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479,487-488 (1998).
"' Filartiga,630 F.2d at 877.
114 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1,cl.2.
"'
116 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.

See U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; U.N. Participation Act of 1945,
ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619, as amended, 22 U.S.C.S. § 287-2871 (2001).
117
See United Sates v. The Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
"Id. at 1465
11

See id. at 1464.

20

' See id. at 1460.
121See id. at 1466.
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rights required by sections 11-13 [of the Headquarters
Agreement] and, as a later enacted statute, would supersede
the Headquarters Agreement in this regard as a matter of
domestic law. The proposed legislation would also ... break a
40-year practice regarding observer missions by nations
hosting U.N. bodies and could legitimately be viewed as
inconsistent with our responsibilities under sections
11-13 of
22
the Unites Nations HeadquartersAgreement.1
The court continued with a discussion of the later-in-time rule for when
a statute is passed subsequent to a treaty. 23 The court explained
Under our constitutional system, statutes and treaties are both
the supreme law of the land, and the Constitution sets forth no
order of precedence to differentiate between them. Wherever
possible, both are to be given effect. Only where a treaty is
irreconcilable with a later enacted statute and Congress has
clearly evinced an intent to supersede a treaty by enacting
a
24
statute does the later enacted statute take precedent.
As previously stated, a treaty can be superseded by a subsequent act of
Congress.125 However, the Supreme Court has expressed concerns in overriding
treaties. 126 In the Head Money Case,12 7 the Supreme Court, using the later-intime rule to overturn a treaty with a number of European counties, warned:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the government which are parties to
it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of
international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the
injured party chooses to 28
seek redress, which may in the end be
enforced by actual war.

122id.
123See id.

124Id. at 1463.
125Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating:

By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation,
with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of
the land, and no supreme efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to
the same subject the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of
the treaty on the subject is self-executing).
126Head Money Case, 112 U.S. 580, 589 (1884).
127See Id.
128Id.
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Whenever29possible, statutes should be construed as to not override

treaty obligations. 1

Congress should have an extremely credible reason for passing
legislation that directly contradicts a treaty, especially multilateral treaties such
as the UN Charter and the HeadquartersAgreement.130 Treaties are the swiftest
and easiest way to effect global cooperative decisions.1 3 1 We are at a point in
history where every new day brings an increase to the myriad of pressing global
problems that require global debate and resolution. 32 As a result, the United
States should not adopt an approach to international agreements that would
suppress amicable solutions to global issues. The reasons for the UNVAA are
flawed 133 and do not warrant breaching the United States multilateral obligations
to the UN Organization.
In addition, nowhere in the Constitution does it state or infer that
Congress or the Executive has the power to place conditions on sovereign state
representatives. "[A]ll governmental authority derives from the Constitution;
every action by President or Congress, by any official or institution 134
of
government, must find justification and show authority in the Constitution."'
Thus, United States representatives who conduct diplomatic
relations with other
135
nations derive their authority from the Constitution.
Article II of the Constitution grants the President the authority "with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate" to "appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls."' 136 It can be inferred that through Article II the President
129See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). There is a canon of

construction, expressed by the Supreme Court, which says, "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. This cannon is
commonly referred to as the "Charming Betsy canon." Id.
130See HENKIN, supranote 43, at 210-11. Some have concluded that the later-in-time
doctrine
should not apply to multilateral treaties. See Szasz, The PalestineLiberationOrganizationMission
Controversy, 82 A.S.I.L. Proceedings 534, 538 (1988) (stating:
While it is a very old and perhaps outmoded principle of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court has held that the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, article VI,
section 2, places laws and treaties on the same level and thus allows the later in time to
prevail, I cannot agree with my learned predecessor that this constitutes black-letter law.
The later-in-time rule depends on a series of court decisions which ... are decisions that
bear reexamination, particularly as to their application to multilateral treaties such as the
UN Charter and to agreements made pursuant to the Charter).
131Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Car, MultilateralTreaties and the Formationof Customary
InternationalLaw, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 72 (1996).
132For example, President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, proclaimed that:
America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to
achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and free
societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from
Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the force of terror
cannot stop the momentum of freedom.
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-l1 .html.
133See supra Part 1I.
134HENKIN, supra note 43, at 25 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
135
See id.
136U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.

189

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol2/iss1/9

16

Flemma: The Case for the Repeal of Congressional Legislation that Places

is "able to decide ... the contents of communications to his ambassadors and to
foreign governments, including the attitudes and intentions of the United States
that constitute U.S. foreign policy.' ' 137 However, the President does not appoint

the UN representatives of foreign states and the Senate has no opportunity to
offer consent. Consequently, the United States has no authority over sovereign
state representatives to any international organization, and thus wields no direct
influence on how member states "should" vote within the General Assembly.
Congress has been known "to attach strings to its expenditures, to
coerce recipients into conduct which it might not be able constitutionally to
compel if it sought to do so by direct regulation." 138 For example, an Act,
entitled "United States Participation in the United Nations if Israel is Illegally
Expelled", declared that the United States would "reduce its annual assessed
contribution to the United Nations ... by 8.34 percent for each month" that Israel
is banned from participating in the UN Organization. 139 While Congress may
have authority to condition federal funds to international organizations that the
United States is a party to, Congress, with no accountability to sovereign states,
cannot place conditions on their participation in international organizations.
However, Congress has no authority to trespass upon how sovereign foreign
governments choose to vote in international organizations. To do so would be a
perversion of the democratic ideals the UN
Organization and United States
140
uphold and encourage throughout the world.
Congress also has the power to regulate extraterritorially with respect
to United States citizens who reside outside of the United States. 14 However,
Congress has never attempted to directly place conditions on sovereign state
citizens. If the United States expects foreign nations to respect our sovereignty,
then we should respect theirs and honor the principles found in the UN Charter,
the HeadquartersAgreement, The Law of Treaties and the Constitution. 142 The
UNVAA flagrantly violates United States domestic law. For these reasons the
UNVAA should be repealed.

V.

THE

UNVAA

SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A MATTER OF POLICY

Today, international diplomacy has "a substantive goal, the promotion
of democracy."' 143 "United Nations-based values enjoy worldwide acceptance
and can provide that common understanding, for societies and markets alike.

137 HENKIN,
138Albert J.

supranote 43, at 38.
Rosenthal, ConditionalFederal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103,

1104 (1987).
"9 22 U.S.C. § 2651 note (b)(2001).
140See U.N. CHARTER; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
141See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American, 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
142See Senator Helms Address (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/minority/2000/pr012000.cfm.
143See Watson, supra note 35, at 852 (emphasis in original).
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They are the cornerstone of our interdependent world and the foundation of the
global economy."' 44
The United States is comprised of 290 million citizens who place their
trust in elected officials to represent their interests. 145 "But the international
community is a tiny one, comprising fewer than two hundred states, and when it
addresses major issues that will affect most member's for a long period of time,
46
that community can still afford the luxury of counting every member's vote."'1
The ability to cast a vote free from conditions is paramount to the
47
democratic process the United States and the United Nations promote.
Legislation such as the UNVAA, by usurping United States treaty148obligations,
invites ramifications and disdain from the international community.
A. The UNVAA Would Incite Retaliation From Member States
Retaliation would most likely come in the form of reciprocity from any
or all of the 185 Governments that comprise the UN Organization. 149The
concept of reciprocity governs much of international law in the area of
diplomatic privileges and immunities. 150 The UNVAA would prompt other
states, if sovereign equality is to be preserved, to enact similar domestic
legislation placing conditions upon United States General Assembly voting. The
United States Supreme Court in interpreting a provision of a treaty stated, "[i]t is
a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be
liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intentions of the parties to
secure equality and reciprocity between them."'151 The court went on to define
treaties as "contracts between independent nations."' 152 These agreements, if
broken, will lead other states to breach their obligations owed to 53
the United
States, equality would be threatened and global stability endangered.
Retaliation between states probably would intensify. 5 4 Senator Jesse
Helms provides an example in his address before the UN on the subject of

Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address Before the United States Chamber of Commerce (June
10, 1999).
145See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. POP Clock Projection,at http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/popclock
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
146 See Watson supra note 35, at 830.
147See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (stating "[tihe right to vote freely
for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government").
148
See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and lts
Treaties: Observance andBreach, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 313, 315 (2001).
149
See id.
1-'
See Boos v. Waller, 485 U.S. 312, 323 (1988).
1 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890). The treaty the Supreme Court interpreted was
between the United States and France, entered into on May 23, 1853, to restrict the ownership of real
estate in the Territories of the American Citizens. See id.
14

152id.

See Vagts supra note 148, at 313.
'5 See Senator Helms Address (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/minority/2000/pr012000.cfro.
'53
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United States arrears.' 55 He stated that if the UN did not institute reform
according to United States wishes:
The alternative would have been to continue to let the U.S.-UN
relationship spiral out of control. You [the UN Security Council] would
have taken retaliatory measures, such as revoking America's vote in the
General Assembly. Congress would likely have responded with
retaliatory measures against the UN. And the end result, I believe,
would have been a breach
of U.S.-UN relations that would have served
56
the interests of no one.'
Similarly, the UNVAA would invite reciprocal disregard for international law
and democracy that would benefit no one.
Additionally, America's participation in what Secretary-General Kofi
Annan calls "the 'soft infrastructure' of the global economy, ensuring the free
flow of goods, services, finance and ideas" could be complicated by states who
rally together against the United States violation. 57 UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stated, without democratic values such as "rules governing contracts and
property rights; without confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and
transparency - there could be no well-functioning markets.' 5 8
Specifically, the United Nations has negotiated international
agreements that allow ships to navigate the seas and international straits,
authorize airplanes to fly and land across borders and allow mail and related
goods to flow throughout the world. 159 In addition, UN agreements regulate
trademarks, patents and international telecommunications. 160 While these UN
labors seldom make news and are not blatantly obvious, one would know the
minute they were missing. 16 1 The UNVAA's disregard for international law
could start a reciprocity domino effect within the international community that
could hinder America's participation62 in and the stability of this "soft
infrastructure of the global economy". 1
The UNVAA could also create internal conflict and retaliation.
Effective United States foreign diplomacy requires the government to speak
with one voice. 63 The UNVAA could have Congress claiming foreign aid is
prohibited to State A because of the UN voting mechanism,' 64 while the
155See id.

156
Id.

"'?Secretary - General Kofi Annan, Address before the United States Chamber of Commerce, in
Washington D.C. (June 10, 1999).
158
Id.
159See id.

'60
See id.

161See id.
162 id.

163See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, February 15, 1816, stating, "[t]he nature of transactions with
foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends
on secrecy and dispatch")).
" See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(aX2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

19

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 9

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

Executive Branch has promised State A foreign aid to further strategic
diplomatic relations. For example, a few days after Senator Helms speech before
the UN, 165 the then Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright spoke before the
UN Security Council. 66 Secretary Albright, discussing Senator Helms' speech,
stated:
Chairman Helms is a man of conviction and strong advocate
of a distinct point of view about the United Nations and America's
relationship to it.
So let me be clear: only the President and the Executive
Branch can speak for the United States. Today, on behalf of the
President, let me say that the Administration, and I believe most
Americans see our role in the world, and our relationship
to this
67
Organization, quite differently than does Senator Helms.1

On this occasion, the United States spoke with different voices, "thereby
diluting or even obscuring American intentions and American influence
abroad."'168 Similarly, the UNVAA could cause the United States to speak with
divergent voices, which
would damage United States credibility and influence in
69

global community.

B. The UNVAA Would Create Uncertaintyin InternationalLaw
"International law is law like other law, promoting order, guiding,
restraining, regulating behavior."' 170 "The greatest challenge for international law
is enforcing its norms against member states."' 71 Consent of the international
community through treaties offers an answer to achieving this goal. 72 The
UNVAA could place the international communities commitment to treaty
obligations in doubt by sparking a host of reciprocal statutory initiatives by other
states violating their
treaty obligations to offset the United States intrusion on
73
their sovereignty. 1

The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of The United
States argues:
A principal weakness perceived in international law is the lack of
effective police authority to enforce it. That is indeed a weakness, but
the criticism reflects misplaced emphasis. Effective police authority
deters violations of law, but there are other inducements to compliance.
In the international system, law is observed because of a combination
See Senator Helms Address (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/minority/2000/prOl200.cfn.
165

See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Welcoming Remarks at the UN Security Council
Session on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Jan. 24, 2000).
'6

Id.

167

'mWatson, supra note 35, at 850.
169See Vagts, supra note 148, at 332.
170RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
171Watson, supra note 35, at 830.
172

pt. I, introductory note (1987).

See id.

173See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
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of forces, including the unarticulated recognition by states generally of
the need for order, and of their common interest in maintaining
particular norms and standards, as well as every state's desire to avoid
the consequences of violation, including damage
to its 'credit' and the
174
particular reactions by the victim of a violation.
The UNVAA would damage United States "credit", invites negative reciprocity
from member states and the general need for harmony among states. 175 Equally
damaging, the UNVAA would stigmatize UN precepts and standards,
particularly the one-nation, one-vote General Assembly system.
In the private sector "[b]usinesspeople honor their contracts for many
of the same reasons as states -- they may fear retaliation, or more commonly,
they do not wish to jeopardize a mutually beneficial long-term relationship for
short-term gain."' 176 Similarly, states need to maintain order by 1honoring
their
77
treaty obligations to facilitate constructive steadfast relationships.
The terms, good faith and honor have been used to describe the binding
effect of treaties.1 78 The Third Circuit defined "good faith" as, "the duty of each
party to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a
fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party
freedom from coercion,
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from
17 9
the other party."'
While international law has evolved over time, it still is "derived to
some extent from principles of morality."'180 President Woodrow Wilson would
agree. 181 In President Wilson's Fourteen PointSpeech, which was his vision of
what needed to transpire in order to affect a lasting peace in the wake of World
War II, argues that morality, good faith and ethics have to be the foundation for
the foreign diplomacy of a democratic society. 182 These values continue to be a
foundation of treaty obligations, which are vital to beneficial and stable

174Id.
175
See id.

176Watson,supra note

35, at 795.

171
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. I, introductory note (1987).
178See

Vagts, supra note 148, at 324.

179
General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 n.16 (3d Cir. 2001)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 122 1(e)).
180
Bradley, supranote 112, at 512.
181See Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech (Jan. 8, 1918), reprintedin ARTHUR
S. LINK ET
AL., EDS., THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (vol. 45 1984).
182See id.
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to expect and
diplomatic and economic relationships. 8 3 States have "a right
18 4
require its stipulations to be kept with scrupulous good faith."'
The UNVAA is blatantly unethical in its disregard for international law
and invades the sovereignty of General Assembly member voters.
Consequently, the UNVAA would undermine international law, and, at best,
would put the honor and good faith of the United States on uncertain ground.
C. The 'Exemption' and 'Waiver' Provisions of the UNVAA
The proposed legislation contravenes United States treaty obligations
even though the UNVAA allows the Secretary of State to exempt countries 8 5 or
waive the requirement of voting accountability. 8 6 The UNVAA provides that
after determining a fundamental change has taken place within a UN member
state that has been prohibited from receiving federal aid because of their voting
practices, and this change will cause the country to no longer oppose the United
States position in the UN General Assembly, the Secretary of State may exempt
that state allowing it to receive foreign aid. This exemption only lasts until the
next report on Voting Practices in the United Nations is released by the State
Department pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2414a.8 7 This "exemption" does not change
the equal rights of sovereign members
the fact that the UNVAA does not respect
88
within the UN General Assembly. 1
In addition, "[s]ecrecy in respect of information gathered by them [the
State Department] may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it
productive of harmful results." 89 For national security reasons the Secretary of
State may not be able to reveal the reasons for exempting
a foreign state. 190 The
19 1
authority".
same logic can be applied to the "waiver
The "waiver authority" delineated in the UNVAA would allow the
Secretary of State to waive the voting accountability requirement if it was
necessary in fulfilling United States diplomacy objectives. 92 As previously
stated, the Secretary of State, in the interest of national security, may not be able
to disclose the reasoning behind the waving of voting accountability for a
particular foreign member. 93 More material is the fact that if the UNVAA is
183

See 0. Lee Reed, Law, The Rule of Law, and Property:A Foundationfor the PrivateMarket and

Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L. J. 441, 442 (2001); see also, SINCLAIR, supranote 55, at 84 (stating:
[t]he [Vienna Convention] Commission was also of the opinion that a means should be
found in the ultimate text of a convention on the law of treaties to emphasise the
fundamental nature of the obligation to perform treaties in good faith... be given stress
in the preamble to the convention just as it is already stressed in the Preamble to the [UN]
Charter.).
184 See Vagts, supra note 148, at 334.
'85See H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(b)(2001).
'86

See id. at § 2(c).
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See id. at § 2(b).
188

See supra Part III. C. 1.
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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'90See id.
19'H.R. 1302, 107th Cong. § 2(c)(2001).
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enacted and even if the Secretary of State waived the objective voting
accountability test for every UN member state, the UNVAA would still be law
and this violates US-UN treaty obligations and domestic law.194

VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the inappropriateness of enacting the UNVAA
on the grounds that it violates fundamental precepts of international and treaty
law, conflicts with the UN Charterand the HeadquartersAgreement, disregards
the Constitution and amounts to dangerous and bad policy.
The UNVAA would have a negative impact on the UN Organization,
member states, the United States and democratic diplomacy at a time when there
is increased interdependence among nations and increased discourse of global
issues. 195 The United States should not degrade its honor, good faith and
democratic ideals with legislation such as the UNVAA. As the Supreme Court
stated, "[a]s a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of
sovereignty. As it has the charter of nationality it has the powers of nationality,
especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other 19countries.
6
We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassingsuch powers.
"[T]hose in the United States or elsewhere 'who believe we can do
without the UN, or impose our will upon it misread history and misunderstand
the future."''197 Former President William Jefferson Clinton stated, "[t]he great
question of this new century is whether the age of interdependence is going to be
good or bad for humanity. The answer depends upon ...whether we all can
develop a level of consciousness
high enough to understand our obligations and
198
responsibilities to each other."
With increased globalization and the necessary rise in the number and
breath of international organizations created to deal with essential global
problems, it is vital that the respect, integrity and independence of those
organizations not be undermined, coerced and inappropriately devoid.199
Rejection of the UNVAA will help to ensure the right of independent sovereign
states to cast their votes and freely participate in all international organizations.
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See UN CHARTER; 22 U.S.C. §287 note (2001).
195
See Hickey, supranote 2, at 18.
196
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (cited in Curtiss-WrightExpress Corp., 299 U.S. at
322) (emphasis added).
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History of the Department of State Duringthe Clinton Presidency(1993-2001), ch. VI (U.S.
Dept. of State), available at http://www.state.gov/www/about state/history/ch6.htm.
198
William Jefferson Clinton, All Nations Must Share the Burdens, NEWSDAY,Jan. 14, 2002, at A19.
'99
See Hickey, supra note 2, at18.
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THE STARR FOUNDATION
The Starr Foundation was established in 1955 by Cornelius Vander
Starr, an insurance entrepreneur who founded the American
International family of insurance and financial services companies,
now known as American International Group, Inc. (NYSE:AIG).
Mr. Starr, a pioneer of globalization, set up his first insurance
venture in Shanghai in 1919. He died in 1968 at the age of 76,
leaving his estate to the Foundation.
The Foundation currently has assets of approximately $3 billion,
making it one of the largest private foundations in the United
States. It makes grants in a number of areas, including education,
medicine and healthcare, public policy, human needs, culture and
the environment.
In addition to endowed C.V. Starr Scholarships, the Foundation
also supports financial aid programs and specialized internships at
numerous undergraduate and graduate institutions nationwide,
including schools of law, business, technology and liberal arts, as
well as the United Negro Scholarship Fund and a group of
historically black colleges and universities.
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